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recordings unprotected by uniform federal law. Unfortunately, in
attempting to undermine the distasteful business of tape piracy, the
Court set aside sound legal reasoning for a cause that, to be handled
properly, required legislative attention and revision of the federal
Copyright Act to include sound recordings explicitly within its
scope. Effective relief will come only when Congress decides to
assert its full power in the copyright field, by enacting a permanent
version of its tape piracy statute. At that time, the Goldstein deci-
sion will admittedly be rendered moot with respect to tape and
sound recordings. However, it will remain a misguided precedent
for future cases regarding state protection of federally unprotected
classes of writings.
SUSAN KAGAN LANGE
Labor Law—Civil Rights Act of 1964—Burdens of Proof in Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases—McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.' —Percy H. Green, a black mechanic, was hired by the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation in 1956. In 1963, Green requested
and was granted a transfer to a position as a laboratory
technician—a position with no union security—in the aircraft man-
ufacturing plant in St. Louis. In 1964, Green was laid off along with
a number of other workers from his department as a result of a
decrease in work load.
Green had been active in the civil rights movement during his
tenure with McDonnell Douglas. He protested his discharge as being
racially motivated to the President's Commission on Civil Rights;
the United States Departments of Justice, the Navy, and Defense;
and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. During late 1964
and 1965, Green protested McDonnell Douglas' allegedly racially
discriminatory hiring practices as a member of CORE and AC-
TION, two civil rights groups. The protests included picketing the
home of James F. McDonnell, chairman of the board of McDonnell
Douglas; a "stall-in" which blocked the main highway access route
to the McDonnell Douglas plant by means of parking rows of cars in
the road; and a "lock-in" during which certain McDonnell Douglas
employees were locked into a downtown St. Louis office building
field open in view of contemplated major reforms of the Copyright Act in the near future.
Yarnell, supra note 121, at 242. However, Justice Douglas concluded that, notwithstanding
the strong drive for federal protection of sound recordings, Congress was reluctant to enact
this amendment for more than a limited trial period in which this new monopoly approach
could be considered. 412 U.S. at 574 (dissenting opinion).
1
 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The statement of facts presented in this note is digested from the
Supreme Court opinion, id, at 794-98; the circuit court opinion, 463 F.2d 337, 338-40 (8th Cir.
1972); and the district court opinion, 318 F. Supp. 846, 847-50 (F.D. Mo. 1970}.
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housing their offices. As a result of the "stall-in," plaintiff's car was
.towed and he pleaded guilty to the charge of obstructing traffic.
Although during the "lock-in" plaintiff was not physically involved
in chaining the door, he testified to the district court that he ap-
proved the action.
On July 26, 1965, Green responded to an advertisement run in
the St. Louis newspapers the previous day seeking applicants for the
position of electric mechanic. McDonnell Douglas refused to hire
him, although the company "never has disputed [his] technical abil-
ity to perform the work required in that position." 2
On September 14, 1965, Green filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He charged that
McDonnell Douglas refused to hire him "because of [his] race and
because of [his] persistent involvement in the Civil Rights
Movement:* The EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that
McDonnell Douglas had refused to employ Green because of his
involvement in civil rights activities, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 The EEOC made no finding as to Green's
claim of racial bias, also prohibited by Title VII. 8
After EEOC conciliation efforts failed, the EEOC informed
Green that he had a right to institute action in federal court. 6 On
April 15, 1968, Green filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, charging McDonnell
Douglas with denying him employment "because of his involvement
in civil rights activities." On March 20, 1969, Gieen attempted to
amend his complaint to include racial bias as a reason for McDon-
nell Douglas' refusal to rehire. On motion of defendant, the
amended portion was stricken and dismissed. 8 The court held that
there is no federal jurisdiction over a ground for complaint when the
EEOC has made no finding as to reasonable cause with respect to
that ground.
The case was then tried on the issue of whether McDonnell
Douglas had refused to rehire plaintiff because of his civil rights
activities. The district court held:
2 463 F.2d at 339.
3 Id.
Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. it , 2000e-3(a) (Supp. II 1972),
provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter ... ."
5 Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ... .
6
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), (3) (Supp. II 1972).
7
 318 F. Supp. at 847.
8
 299 F. Supp. 1100 (ED. Mo. 1969).
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(a) Plaintiff has not shown that defendant was moti-
vated by racial prejudice or because of plaintiff's legitimate
civil rights activities. . . .
(c) The Civil Rights Act does not protect activity
which blocks entrance into or from an employer's plant or
office.
(d) Defendant's refusal to reemploy plaintiff was
based on plaintiff's misconduct, which justified the refusal
to rehire. 9
Green appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, claiming (1) that the trial court erred in determining
that participation in the "stall-in" and "lock-in" did not fall within
the protection of the Civil Rights Act, and (2) that the trial court
erred in striking his claim of racial bias against McDonnell
Douglas. 1 ° The court of appeals upheld the lower court's disallow-
ance of Green's claim of discrimination on the basis of his participa-
tion in civil rights activities, stating that "an applicant's past par-
ticipation in unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer
might indicate the applicant's lack of a responsible attitude toward
performing work for that employer." 11 However, the appellate court
also held that the trial court had erred in striking Green's claim of
racial bias, as an EEOC finding of reasonable cause is not a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to a civil action in federal court for employment
discrimination." The court therefore remanded the case for a full
consideration of Green's claim of racial bias.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" "[On
order to clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action
challenging employment discrimination . . . ." 14 The Court's opinion
in McDonnell Douglas, written by justice Powell, establishes new
standards of proof for cases of employment discrimination. The
opinion also sets forth the requirements for action by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in order to establish federal
jurisdiction in a case of alleged employment discrimination. Fur-
thermore, the opinion modifies the standards laid down in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 15 as to what will constitute a valid justification for
an employer's refusal to hire. The Court, vacating the court of
appeals' judgment and remanding for further consideration, HELD:
9 318 F. Sum). at 851. The court's conclusion "(h)" dealt with plaintiffs claim that his
original layoff was also racially motivated, a claim which the district court found barred by
the statute of limitations. This issue will not be discussed further in this note.
With regard to conclusion "(a)," query why the court, having stricken Green's amended
count as to racial bias, then commented upon the merits of this charge in the opinion.
10 463 F.2d at 340.
" Id. at 353 (revised opinion).
'' Id. at 342.	 •
13
 409 U.S. 1036 (1972).
" 411 U.S. at 798.
13 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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In a case of employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act,
the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case. In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination,
the complainant must establish:
(1) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications. 16
The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must establish a
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for plaintiff's rejection."
The plaintiff must then be granted an opportunity to prove that
defendant's stated reason is merely a ipretext." The Court also held
that the absence of an EEOC finding of reasonable cause does not
defeat federal jurisdiction in cases of alleged racial discrimination in
employment. 19
This note will discuss the shifting burdens of proof in employ-
ment discrimination cases, as set forth by the Court in McDonnell
Douglas. The new standards established by the Court for proving a
prima facie case and for rebutting such a case will be examined. The
Court's creation of a third step in the chain of proof will then be
discussed and criticized. Finally, this note will examine the Court's
elimination of the necessity of an EEOC finding on each charge in
order for the federal courts to exert jurisdiction in cases of alleged
employment discrimination.
As is true in the usual civil action, the burden of going forward
with evidence in employment discrimination cases rests initially with
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff successfully shows all four required
elements, as set out above, he has established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. Such criteria do not include a burden on the
plaintiff to prove any element of intent to discriminate on the part of
the employer. 20
In prior cases charging employment discrimination, the courts
have often placed the burden on the plaintiff to establish by a
411 U.S. at 802 (outline form supplied).
17 Id .
111
 Id. at 804.
19
 Id. at 798.
20
 The requirement of intent has been all but eliminated in case law preceding McDon-
nell Douglas. In Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969),
the court said: "[The statute [the Civil Rights Act] ... requires only that the defendant meant
to do what he did, that is, his employment practice was not accidental." Accord, Jones v. Lee
Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Local 357,
IBEW, 356 F. Supp. 104, 117 (D. Nev. 1973); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.,
338 F. Supp. 532, 559 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
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preponderance of the evidence that the employer has dis-
criminated. 21 Some courts have gone so far as to require the plaintiff
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer has
discriminated intentionally. 22 The Court in McDonnell Douglas re-
quired much less of the plaintiff: merely that he prove the factual
framework which would lead to a conclusion of racial discrimina-
tion. The Court's recitation of necessary elements substantially
echoes the finding of the court of appeals in this case that "[w]hen
a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications to
fill a job opening and that he was denied the job, - . . he presents a
prima facie case of racial discrimination . . . ." 2 i
One 'might predict that since the requirements of making out a
prima facie case of racial discrimination have become easier to meet,
dozens of employers will be subject to actions alleging racially
discriminatory employment practices. But the Court has kept the
adversary relationship balanced in that the requirements for the
employer to rebut the prima facie case have also been eased. Once
the plaintiff has established the elements of a prima facie case, the
burden then shifts to the employer to set forth some "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for his rejection of the plaintiff. 24 In this
case, the Court found that McDonnell Douglas' stated reason for not
rehiring Green—that is, participation in illegal demonstrations
against the corporation—was reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
"We think that this suffices to discharge petitioner's burden of proof
at this stage and to meet respondent's prima facie case of
discrimination." 25
While adequately deciding the case before it, the Court failed to
establish any guidelines as to what constitutes a "legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason," thereby diminishing the precedential value of
the decision. Justice Powell said: "We need not attempt in the
instant case to detail every matter which fairly could be recognized
as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire." 26 The Court relied on
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 27 a case brought under the
National Labor Relations Act, in order to substantiate the conten-
tion that an employer need not "absolve and rehire one who has
engaged in . . . deliberate, unlawful activity against it." 28 But the
Court would not decide whether unlawful activity in and of itself
can serve as a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for
21 See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1970); Ochoa v.
Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Barnes v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 323 F.
Supp. 617, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also McDonnell Douglas, 463 F.2d at 343.
22 See, e.g., Frockt v. Olin Corp., 344 F. Supp. 369, 370 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Andres v.
Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 321 F, Supp. 895, 898 (W.D. La. 1971).
23 463 F.2d at 344.
24 411 U.S. at 802.
25
 Id, at 803.
2° Id. at 802-03.
27 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939), quoted in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
28 411 U.S. at 803.
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respondent's refusal to rehire: "We' need not consider or decide here
whether, or under what circumstances, unlawful activity not di-
rected against the particular employer may be a legitimate
justification for refusing to hire." 29
 Thus, although it is clear that
the standards articulated bythe Court in this case have changed the
previous standards for rebutting a prima facie case of employment
discrimination, it is more difficult to determine precisely what the
new standards are.
The Eighth Circuit in McDonnell -Dougias applied traditional
standards in ruling that the burden was on the employer "to demon-
strate a substantial relationship between the reasons offered for
denying employment and the requirements of the job."3° This is
what has usually been required of the employer in the past—to
articulate some "business necessity" which required him to apply a
particular standard (e.g., requirement of a high school diploma, or
disqualification of anyone with a criminal record) to all potential
employees or employees eligible for promotion. 31 The burden of
persuasion was on the defendant to demonstrate "that the adverse
action was based on business necessity, was carefully tailored to the
precise peculiarities of the immediate situation, and did not involve
any residual elements of the operation of a discriminatory system." 32
In addition to articulating a legitimate business necessity, the
employer had to show that he had applied such qualifications to all
employees equally." For instance, if a corporation could prove that
the position was of such a nature 'that it demanded employees who
were free from any past convictions, this standard would have to be
applied to all white applicants as well as to black applicants.
The case which has provided much of the precedent in the area
of "business necessity" as a justification for what might otherwise be
labeled discriminatory hiring practices is Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 34 In Griggs, the question before the Court was whether re-
quirements of standardized tests and a high school diploma as
requisites for employment or promotion, which requisites tend gen-
erally to operate against the employment and promotion of blacks,
are discriminatory. The Court concluded that such tests are out-
lawed by Title VII unless it can be shown that they are "a reasona-
ble measure of job performance." 35
 This case was discussed by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas. 36 However, the Court failed
to recognize the significant relationship between the two cases. It is
29 Id. at 803 n.17.
30 463 F.2d at 344,
31 See cases discussed in text at notes 34-35, 39-46 infra.
32
 Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 87 (1972).
33
 See, e.g., Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La.
1971).
34 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35 Id. at 436.
56 411 U.S. at 805-06.
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submitted that the McDonnell Douglas decision in fact broadens the
scope of what is declared a legitimate reason sufficient to rebut a
prima facie case of discrimination under Griggs.
The Court in McDonnell Douglas first tried to discount the
precedential value of Griggs for the instant case:
The court below appeared to rely upon Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., . .. in which the Court stated: "If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited." . . But Griggs differs from the instant case in
important respects. . . [In the instant case, respondent]
had engaged in a seriously disruptive act against the' very
one from whom he now seeks employment. And petitioner
does not seek his exclusion on the basis of a testing device
which overstates what is necessary for competent perfor-
mance, or through some sweeping disqualification of all
those with any past record of unlawful behavior, however
remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's personal
qualifications as an employee. Petitioner assertedly rejected
respondent for unlawful conduct against it and, in the
absence of proof of pretextual or discriminatory application
of such a reason, this cannot be thought the kind of
"artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment" which the Court found to be the intention of Con-
gress to remove. 37
After laboriously distinguishing McDonnell Douglas from
Griggs, the Court then went on to find that even if one were trying
to measure the facts of the instant case against the standards of
Griggs, the results would - be the same: "[I]n this case, given the
seriousness and harmful potential of respondent's participation in
the 'stall-in' and the accompanying inconvenience to other em-
ployees, it cannot be said that petitioner's refusal to employ lacked a
rational and neutral business justification."38 If the facts of McDon-
nell Douglas cannot be judged by Griggs 'standards, why did the
Court deliberately attempt to bolster its decision by fitting the facts
into a Griggs "business necessity" test? It is submitted that what the
Court was doing in McDonnell Douglas was altering the standards
set out in Griggs by broadening their scope; why it was reluctant to
admit this is a mystery. The decision in McDonnell Douglas drasti-
cally changes the concept of "business necessity" and opens up new
areas for reasonable justification of refusal to hire.
The "business necessity" test enunciated in Griggs was applied
and refined in a series of cases prior to McDonnell Douglas. In
37 Id. (citations omitted).
gg Id. at 806 n.21.
660
CASE NOTES
Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 39 the court upheld a policy
which made necessary the discharge of a black bellhop who, it was
discovered, had a previous conviction of theft. The court agreed
that a hotel manager is justified in refusing employment to one
convicted of theft where the employee in the course of employment
will have access to the valuable property of others. The court said:
Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that the pol-
icy followed with respect to the plaintiff has been followed
with regard to white bellmen. . . . Because of this, it may
be concluded that the discharge of the plaintiff was not the
result of an artificial, arbitrary or unnecessary barrier, but
resulted instead from a genuine business need. 4 °
In another major case in the progression of case law defining
the concept of "business necessity," Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,'"
the court narrowed the scope of what will constitute "business
necessity":
[The business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to
override any racial impact; the challenged practice must
effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to
serve; and there must be available no acceptable alter-
native policies or practices which would better accomplish
the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally
well with a lesser differential racial impact. 42
In Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 43 the plaintiffs successfully
challenged racially discriminatory practices in promotion and trans-
fer. The court in Rowe stated:
The only justification for standards and procedures which
may, even inadvertently, eliminate or prejudice minority
group employees is that such standards or procedures arise
from a non-discriminatory legitimate business neces-
sity. .
It is clearly not enough under Title VII that the proce-
dures utilized by employers are fair in form. These proce-
dures must in fact be fair in operation."
Similar reliance was placed on the "business necessity" test in Dor-
cus v. Westvaco Corp.45 and Davis v. Washington."
39 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971),
4° Id. at 521.
41
 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
42
 Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted).
43 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972),
" Id. at 354-55 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
45 345 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D. Va. 1972).
46 352 F. Supp, 187 (D.D.C. 1972),
661
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
It is clear that the courts have imposed their own interpretation
on the test enunciated in Griggs as to what will justify refusal to
hire. The only justification for standards or qualifications which
tend to operate disproportionately against black applicants seeking
employment, promotion or transfer is an "overriding legitimate bus-
iness purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business."'"
It is doubtful whether the Court in McDonnell Douglas could
realistically have accepted the qualification against hiring Green as
falling under the "business necessity" exception. The Court at-
tempted halfheartedly to fit the facts into such a framework," but
because this was not the true basis for the decision, it failed to do so
convincingly. It is submitted that what the Court was really doing
was expanding the allowable justifications for employment decisions
which may appear to discriminate against blacks beyond the narrow
ground of "business necessity."
What the Court has said implicitly in McDonnell Douglas is
that even if the employer-should decide to implement as an employ-
ment policy the disqualification of any applicant who has provably
participated in an illegal demonstration against the company, this
qualification would be justifiable and would successfully rebut the
plaintiffs prima facie case, not on the grounds of business necessity,
but because it is a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Unfortu-
nately, the Court has not gone far enough with this new interpreta-
tion. It has articulated no guidelines as to what factors, in future
cases, will successfully meet the test of a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason. It is conceivable that nearly any requirement could be
justified by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, but one would
presume that the Court did not intend to include any and all
requirements set up by employers. The standards have most
definitely been changed, but only future decisions will determine to
what they have been changed.
Another significant change articulated by the Court is the addi-
tion of another step in the trial process. After the employer has
rebutted the employee's prima facie case, the inquiry does not end.
According to the Court, the employee must then be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that the employer's stated reasons are, in fact,
merely a pretext to cover up racial discrimination. 49 The Court
suggested certain criteria for examination in order to determine
whether the reason given in this case was pretextual: whether the
standard (here refusal to hire one who has participated in illegal
demonstrations which threaten to disrupt the operation of the em-
ployer) was applied to all employees equally; the employer's record
of treatment of the employee during his term of prior employment;
47 Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798.
°a See 411 U.S. at 806 n.21, quoted in text at note 38 supra.
49 Id. at 804.
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the employer's response to the employee's participation in legal
demonstrations; and the employer's general policy with regard to
minority employment. 5 °
In contrast to the framework used by the McDonnell Douglas
Court, the following two-pronged approach to examination of the
charge was used in Witherspoon v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc.: 51
[1] The plaintiff made out a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by the above evidence.
[2] The burden of proving absence of discrimination
moved to defendant, which attempted to explain on the
ground of business necessity, stating that long haul drivers
must have personalities, age, family, and health back-
grounds different from city drivers. But these factors are
not shown to have been applied to the plaintiff or to other
black applicants. 52
In Witherspoon, the question of whether the reason given by the
employer is pretextual seems to be raised as a consideration in the
weight to be placed on the employer's rebuttal. In McDonnell Doug-
las, on the other hand, proof that the employer has used a pretext
becomes a separate act in the play, an element as indispensable to
the proper conduct of the trial as proof of a prima facie case.
It is submitted that the establishment of this new step in the
trial process is wholly unnecessary. The first step is for the plaintiff
to put forth a prima facie case of racial discrimination. It is then up
to the defendant to articulate "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection."" Inherent in articulating a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is the elimination of all doubt
that such reason is pretextual or manufactured. If the burden of
proof is on the defendant to prove a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason in order to rebut the plaintiff's case, then obviously he must
convince the court that his reason is both legitimate and nondis-
criminatory. "Legitimate" is defined by Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary as "genuine."54 If the defendant satisfies the
court that his reason was a genuine nondiscriminatory reason, then
he has proven ipso facto a nonpretextual reason. 55 Since the Court is
5° Id. at 804-05.
s' 457 F,2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
52 Id. at 498 (outline form supplied).
53 411 U.S. at 802.
54 Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1291 (P. Gove
ed. 1963).
55 In Taylor v. Safeway Stares, Inc., 6 FEP Cas. 556 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 1973), the court
followed the sequence of proof outlined in McDonnell Douglas. In Taylor, the plaintiff made
out a prima facie case; the defendant overcame the force of the prima facie case by articulat-
ing a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" in his rebuttal; then the court found that the
defendant's reason was pretextual in the third stage of the case. It is submitted that in such a
case, the defendant has never successfully met his burden of rebuttal; he failed at the second
phase of the case, not at some contrived third step.
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apparently not using "legitimate" in the sense of "genuine," it seems
that the term has been rendered totally meaningless by the Court's
procedural arrangement. Giving the plaintiff an additional oppor-
tunity to challenge this reason is superfluous, since the plaintiff has
had an opportunity to cross-examine during the second phase of this
process. Moreover, the creation of this third step shifts the burden of
proof to the plaintiff. It is submitted that for several reasons the
burden should be on the defendant to prove the legitimacy of his
reason to the court's satisfaction during his rebuttal case.
First, the type of proof that one would need to assert that the
reason enunciated is pretextual—that is, statistics on minority em-
ployment or files on specific employees—is clearly more easily avail-
able to the defendant than to the plaintiff. It is much easier for the
defendant to prove that his reason is nonpretextual by exhibiting his
records for minority hiring for the past few years than it is fo`r the
plaintiff to discover one fact that will assure the court the reason is
pretextual.
In addition, the purpose of the Civil Rights Act would seem to
be not only to assure employees of access to the federal courts with
their complaints, but also to assure them of affirmative relief where
discrimination has taken place. By relieving the defendant of the
burden of proving that his reason is not makeshift, the Court is
leaving him with no burden at all. In order to rebut, he must merely
come up with any reason which can be found legitimate and nondis-
criminatory, even if that reason is a sham, for it is now the
plaintiff's responsibility to prove that it is a sham.
Another important holding of McDonnell Douglas is that the
failure of the EEOC to find reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of the Civil Rights Act has occurred does not defeat federal
jurisdiction. Under the statutory scheme set up in the Civil Rights
Act, 56
 the plaintiff must first make his complaint to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC is then
afforded an opportunity to investigate the charges informally. The
Commission then decides whether or not there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charges are true.
If the EEOC finds reasonable cause, there is a mandatory
period during which the EEOC is expected to attempt to eliminate
the alleged discriminatory practice through "conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion."57
 If the EEOC finds no reasonable cause, the
complaint is dismissed.
It is clear from the statute that after the conciliation period, if
the EEOC has failed to bring a resolution of the problem, either the
EEOC, the complainant or in some cases the Attorney General may
sue in a United States district court. 58 As long as the charge was
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. II 1972).
57 Id.
513 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), (3) (Supp. II 1972).
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properly filed initially, even if the complaint was dismissed by the
EEOC, the plaintiff still has this right."
In McDonnell Douglas, the district court dismissed Green's
complaint of racial discrimination in McDonnell Douglas' hiring
procedure because the EEOC made no finding as to reasonable
cause. 6° The Eighth Circuit remanded the case for full trial on this
charge, holding that an EEOC finding of reasonable cause is not a
prerequisite to establishing federal, jurisdiction. 61
The point of contention arises because although the statute
spells out clearly the rights of complainants where the EEOC has
found reasonable cause and where the EEOC has found no reason-
able cause, the statutory language makes no mention of the eventu-
ality that the EEOC makes no finding on the charge at all, as
occurred in this case. However, there is no reason to treat the
Commission's failure to make a finding any differently than a Com-
mission finding of no reasonable cause. The reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit in Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Construction Corp. 62 would
seem equally applicable here:
We are convinced that Congress did not intend to make the
EEOC final arbiter of complainants' rights. . . . The
Commission is neither required nor physically able to con-
duct an "in depth" investigation in every case . . . We
will not permit the single finding of this investigatory
agency to stand as a complete defense which precludes all
hope of adversary adjudication or remedial action in the
courts."
In fact, courts in the past have permitted suits in cases where the
EEOC has made no finding on the charge of discriminatory
practices. 64
What the Supreme Court has done in McDonnell Douglas is to
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972) provides in part:
.. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section,
is dismissed by the Commission . , . or the Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or
the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision, shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days
after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent
named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (13) if such charge
was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges
was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice. . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(f)(3) (Supp. II 1972) provides in part: "Each United States district
court . . . shall have jurisdiction o: [such actions]. . . ."
60 298 F. Supp. at 1102.
61 463 F.2d at 342.
62 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971).
63 Id. at 1138, 1141.
" See, e.g., Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Lowry v.
Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Mo. 1972); cf. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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make it more difficult for plaintiffs to successfully prove charges of
discriminatory employment practices. Although the Court reduces
the requirements for establishing a prima facie case, at the same
time it opens up a whole new area of grounds that will serve to
rebut such a prima facie case. Whereas in the past the defendant
had to prove some business necessity in order to rebut a prima facie
case of discrimination, now any legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
will do. The Court is reluctant to describe its holding as broadening
the standards articulated in Griggs; but that is exactly what it has
done. The scope of "legitimate, nondiscriminatory, reason[s]" is
much broader than that of "business necessity."
In addition, the Court has now put the burden of proof of the
issue of pretext on the plaintiff instead of on the defendant. If the
Court is going to demand proof of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason as rebuttal, then it is submitted that the question as to
whether there has been any pretext should arise there; the defendant
should have the burden, in his rebuttal, of proving that his reason is
nonpretextual as an element of the legitimacy of that reason. The
McDonnell Douglas Court, in establishing a whole new step in the
trial procedure, has significantly increased the plaintiffs burden of
proof.
The Court in McDonnell Douglas has also committed a serious
omission in declining to establish any guidelines for what will serve
as a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." This omission will un-
doubtedly create snarls of litigation in attempts to establish just
what the Court really meant. Of course, it is impossible to provide
for all eventualities in the potential employment discrimination suits
which may arise. But it is submitted that the Court should have
been somewhat more specific than simply enunciating the standards
of "legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory;" it should have articulated
some guidelines for interpreting these standards.
The decision in McDonnell Douglas has grave implications.
Any step which makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to hold em-
ployers accountable for discriminatory employment practices is an
unwelcome one. The congressional intent of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has been interpreted as encouraging ordinary
citizens to act as private attorneys general in rooting out discrimina-
tion wherever they might experience it. 65 The prospect of decreased
chances for success in this effort frustrates that intent.
RUTH S. HOCHBERGER
65 See LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel, & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602, 611 (E.D. La. 1971).
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